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Abstract 
 
This paper uses the Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) analytical framework to investigate the 
macroeconomic populism in Iran under the Ahmadinejad government. My thesis endeavours 
to place the government of Ahmadinejad in a populist context and forecasts its fall mainly due 
to macroeconomic instabilities. The purpose of this study is to illustrate how closely 
Ahmadinejad’s government follows the model of Dornbusch and Edwards (1990).  
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Extremism does not have a place in the popular government. It 
will be dealt with. All powers and abilities, all opportunities and all 
competencies, will be used in the popular government. The focus will 
be on national interests, national honour, and progress for all. 
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 26 June 2005 
 
With the forming of the ninth government (Ahmadinejad’s government) 
the death knell of intellectualism was sounded. 
Emad Afroogh, head of Majlis Commission for Cultural Affairs, 
29 April 2006 
 
1. Introduction 
Throughout history Governors of developing countries have relied on different tools to 
consolidate their power. While at times, ruling classes have used only military repression to 
deter any threat of revolution, in other cases they have relied on income transfers to the poor 
in order to control them, halting potential efforts on regime change. Despite the global trend 
towards democracy, neo-liberal policies and the fall of dictators in different parts of the 
world, there is no guarantee that no new populist leaders will emerge. On the contrary, most 
of the countries in the Middle East experience economic cycles where concurring episodes 
tend to repeat themselves. The potential threat and concern is the repeated use of populist 
macroeconomic policies to cure the problems of income inequality, despite the existence of 
historical examples and evidence of their harmful results. Populism in the Middle East is 
financed by abundant natural resources such as oil and gas. The governments of these 
countries rely heavily on the revenues that come from these resources in order to implement 
their populist programs. 
In the Iran of today, we once again observe the emergence of a populist regime. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran initially claimed to serve the needy in society. However, this plan to reduce 
the economic gaps between rich and poor was not successful and gradually ceased after the 
destructive war with Iraq.  
The economic development plans after the war required a huge amount of capital. Less 
attention was paid to the needy classes of society and the importance of an effective 
distribution policy. Subsequently, by turning a blind eye to the side-effects of economic 
liberalization on the masses, populism saw a fresh recovery, some 27 years after the victory of 
the Islamic Revolution. 
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Iranians have learned that incomes generated through natural resources like oil and gas go 
hand in hand with corruption in their country. The corrupted state is something that is 
documented in Iranian history and people have tried to find a willing individual within the 
government who really wants to combat this systematic corruption and nepotism. This 
situation creates the context for a special kind of leader to emerge, a person who shows 
interest in the needs of the middle and lower social classes of society and promises to address 
corruption and nepotism issues directly and aims to redistribute the wealth which its people 
considers their right, especially those from oil funds.  
My thesis endeavours to place the government of Ahmadinejad in a populist context and 
forecasts its fall mainly due to macroeconomic instabilities. I apply the Dornbusch and 
Edwards (1990) framework in order to analyze the current situation and the future probable 
position of Ahmadinejad’s government in Iran. In sum, the purpose of this study is to 
illustrate how closely Ahmadinejad's government follows the model of Dornbusch and 
Edwards (1990).  
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the concept of ''populism'' and 
explains the model of Dornbusch and Edwards (hereinafter D&E framework). I will discuss 
the various phases of a populist regime in the D&E model. Section 3 deals with the case of 
Iran. It describes how the country's social and economic situation led to the emergence of a 
populist. I will then explain how the Ahmadinejad government fits within the framework of 
the populist model. Section 3 also describes Ahmadinejad’s policies and details their probable 
effects on the economy. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Defining macroeconomic populism  
Defining populism has proved to be a difficult task. According to Knight (1998), populism in 
Latin America has been intimately related to means for obtaining (and maintaining) political 
power. Roberts (2000) notes that ''In essence, populism is an informal alternative to 
institutionalized forms of political representation,... provided by political parties''. 
According to Di Tella (1965), paternalism is an essential component of populism which is 
characterized by ''a political movement which enjoys the support of the mass of the working 
class an/or the peasant, but which does not result from the autonomous organizational power 
of either of these two sectors”. The populism is a set of economic policy measures (or 
promises) directed towards obtaining support from ''the masses''. 
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In terms of a political approach, perhaps the definition of Weyland (2001) is better than the 
others because it shows the nature of populists: to win and exercise power, while using 
economic and social policy as an instrument for this purpose. According to this definition, 
populism is much more like a tool used by dictators who aim to remain in power for personal 
benefits rather than serving their poor subjects, as they would have them believe. The populist 
leader is charismatic and wins broad and intense support from a largely unorganized mass by 
representing people who feel excluded or marginalized from national political life and by 
promising to rescue them from crisis, threats and enemies (Weyland 2001). 
From various kinds of definitions of populism, ''macroeconomic populism'' is a newer 
concept. D&E (1990) used this term and showed that policy experiences in different countries 
and periods share common features: initial conditions, motivations for policies, different 
domestic conditions, and ultimate collapse. Their model is not a righteous assertion of 
conservative economics, but rather a warning that populist policies will ultimately fail; and 
when they fail it is always at a frightening cost to the very groups who were supposed to be 
favoured. D&E (1990) provide a set of properties to explain populism and define a common 
process. Their model also establishes a link between the behaviour of populist regimes and its 
effects on the macroeconomy. The extreme vulnerability and instability of the populist 
regimes are, by and large, the result of unsustainable policies. The D&E model does not 
explain why the populist leaders behave the way they do. With their model, however, we can 
examine the decisions populists make and how these decisions affect the macroeconomy. 
2.1. Properties of populist leaders and populist policies 
Many populists have an attachment to a specific part of a country or to a specific social class 
such as the working, middle or the agricultural classes. Populists are usually skilled at rhetoric 
and claim to be representatives of all the people, trying to find a foreign enemy in order to 
cover their own weaknesses and mismanagement in domestic affairs. A populist leader tends 
to design a set of plans in order to realize some special political interests, including: 
a) Organizing support from lower middle class groups and organized labour. These 
groups represent the regime's primary support because of the high level of 
discontent with income inequalities. 
 
b) Isolation of elites, rural oligarchy and foreign enterprises. In a populist regime, 
these groups are seen as enemies and rent-seekers who have no regard for the 
lower classes in society. They are also assumed to operate against the populist 
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regime within the domestic economy, trying to hamper the trend of serving needy 
people through the regime. In fact, the interests of such groups tend to conflict 
with the redistributive aims of the populist state (Coupal, 2003). 
In order to meet populist leaders’ goals, they usually follow some specific economic policies 
in the country (Coupal, 2003) such as: 
a) Fiscal deficit to stimulate domestic demand. 
 
b) Increase in the nominal wage accompanied by price controls and huge subsidies. 
c) Control or appreciation of exchange rate to reduce inflation by increasing the 
volume of imports and to increase the income and profits of sectors that are not 
involved in international markets. 
 
2.2. Phasing the Populist Macroeconomy 
D&E (1990) identified the initial conditions for the appearance of a populist regime and four 
phases of its life. In the following sections, I analyze the initial conditions and the four phases 
of Iran under Ahmadinejad. 
a) Initial conditions 
In order to establish a populist regime, three initial conditions are required. The first is that the 
country has experienced slow growth, stagnation, or depression. The second issue is the 
readiness of people for fundamental changes in economic programs because of high income 
inequalities and corruption in the country. The third initial condition is having enough room 
for highly expansionary programs which require sufficient external balance and reserves. 
Without the required reserves for fiscal manoeuvre, the populist regime cannot initiate its 
economic plans. Providing the abovementioned initial condition is present, populist regimes 
may be set in motion and implement their populist economic programs. 
b) Phase 1 
In this phase, the economy experiences lower levels of unemployment, higher output and real 
wages. High levels of imports make it easier for the populist regime to control inflation in 
spite of the expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. Usually, the major source for financing 
imports is rooted in high revenues from natural resources. 
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c) Phase 2 
In this phase, the economy faces a first challenge. Due to the strong expansion in public 
demand, the country runs into growing shortages of foreign exchange reserves which have 
been used for considerable imports in the former phase. It is now the time of introducing 
industry protection, devaluing the currency, and adjusting the prices. In this phase, we observe 
the increase of inflation and wages. Furthermore, a large number of subsidies and gross 
inability on the part of the government to control its increasing expenditures put a great 
burden on government budgets and worsen the budget deficits. 
d) Phase 3  
The main features of this phase are pervasive shortages, an extreme increase in inflation and a 
considerable foreign exchange gap, leading to capital flight and demonetization of the 
economy. The populist regime tries to control the budget crisis by re-examining the amount of 
subsidies and by real depreciation. Economic policies become unstable and real wages fall 
considerably. 
e)  Phase 4 
In this phase, we observe the collapse of the populist government. In the end, real wages 
decrease to a level significantly lower than that prior to the populist government (see Table 1). 
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Table 1 The main properties of phases of populist regime economic life 
Stages/main 
indicators 
Unemployment Inflation Imports Subsidies 
Phase 1 Decreasing (-) Constant or 
decreasing (-) 
Increasing (+) Increasing (+) 
Phase 2 Increasing (+) Increasing(+) ? Increasing (+) 
Phase 3 Increasing (+) Increasing (+) ? Constant or 
decreasing (-) 
Phase 4  Increasing (+) Constant or 
increasing (+) 
Decreasing (-) or 
constant 
Decreasing (-) 
 
Source: Extracted from D&E (1990) 
 
3. From Khatami to Ahmadinejad 
3.1. Initial Conditions (1997-2004) 
A set of initial conditions is necessary to bring a regime to populism. In this section, I explain 
the conditions that allowed Ahmadinejad to be successful with his populist agenda. Through 
eight years of reformist government, the people of Iran and especially the lower classes of 
society were unhappy with the inability of the state to meet their basic needs.  
a) A high degree of inequality was not acceptable for the people in a country rich in oil 
reserves. The official data confirm people’s feelings about their economic situation during 
the reformist government. The Gini index2 in urban areas increased from 0.396 in 1998 to 
0.415 in 2003/04 (Figure 1). In fact, Iranians have hardly experienced a Gini index lower 
than 0.39 since the revolution, indicating the inability of governments since that period to 
use the huge oil revenues at their disposal to establish a welfare state for the people.3 The 
                                                     
2
 This Index measures inequality of distribution of income. It is a number between 0 and 1, where 0 
indicates perfect equality and 1 refers to perfect inequality. 
3
 Based on available data the Gini index of Iran in 1998 was 44.1 compared to 24.7, 36.42, 28.65 in 
Denmark, Jordan, and Pakistan in the same year and to 29.1, 32.9, 32.5, 34.42, 28.31, 40.03, and 25 in 
Austria, Belgium, Canda, Egypt, Germany, Turkey, and Sweden in the year 2000 (World Bank, 2008).  
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income distribution inequality index in urban areas illustrates a considerable increase 
between the richest 10% of households and the poorest 10% in the country during the 
reformist state. While the ratio of richest to poorest 10% of the population was at 13.9 
times in 1998, this ratio increased to about 17 times in 2002 and 16 times in 2003, 
confirming the failure of reformists to decrease income distribution inequalities (Figure 
1). 
0.385
0.390
0.395
0.400
0.405
0.410
0.415
0.420
0.425
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
12.5
13.0
13.5
14.0
14.5
15.0
15.5
16.0
16.5
17.0
17.5
Gini index (left axis) Ratio of richest 10% to poorest 10% (right axis)
 
Fig.1. Initial condition for populist state: growth of inequality. 
Source: CBI (2008). 
 
b) The Misery index makes clearer the situation of the social-economic environment of Iran 
before the populist regime of Ahmadinejad. This index is the sum of unemployment and 
inflation rates. It is assumed that both a higher rate of inflation and unemployment create 
economic and social costs for a country. A combination of rising inflation and more 
people out of work implies deterioration in economic performance and a rise in Misery 
index.  
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Fig.2. Initial condition for populist state: growth of  Misery index.  
The Misery index was over 30% in the last two years of Khatami presidency.In the first year 
of Ahmadinejad government, as predicted by D&E (1990), this index reduced significantly to 
just above 20% (Figure 2).4 
c) Another evidence of weak performance of the reformist government can be observed in 
the GRICS 5  index which was produced by the World Bank. The “Voice and 
Accountability Index” which shows the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and a free media fell from -1.08 in 1996 to -1.36 in 2004, referring to a decline 
in the freedom of speech in this period in spite of the reformist agenda on political 
development. Political stability also showed a diminishing trend. The index fell from -0.37 
in 1996 to -0.91 in 2004. “Government Effectiveness” which measures the quality of 
public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from 
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies fell from -0.30 in 1996 to -
0.66 in 2004. The index of “Rule of Law” which measures the extent to which agents have 
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 Unemployment data from http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/unemployment_rate.html and inflation 
from http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/inflation_rate_(consumer_prices).html (Access: 13.03.2009)  
5
 The Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot is accessible through the Governance & Anti 
Corruption section of the World Bank website. The range of these indicators is from +2.5 to -2.5. The 
former figure indicates the best and the latter the worst situation section under study. 
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confidence in and abide by the rules of society was also disappointing during this period, 
falling from -0.77 in 1996 to -0.83 at the end of the reformist government. Just two 
indicators showed a slight improvement: “Regulatory Quality” and “Control of 
Corruption”. In general, most indicators of governance over this period point to a 
negative performance on the part of the reformist governance in Iran.  
The initial necessary conditions were present for the emergence of populism. The increasing 
inflation during the second term of Khatami reduced the purchse power of public. CPI 
inflation increased from 11.27% in 2001 to 14.76% in 2004, while inflation based on GDP 
deflators reached from 11.63% to 21% in the same period. Furthermore, the GDP growth rate 
had fallen from 7.5% in 2002 to 4% in 2005 (World Bank, 2008).  
Ehteshami and Zweiri (2007, p.xvi) illustrate the disappointment of those who elected 
Khatami: 
“However, it was more surprising to see those who had so wholly bought into Khatami’s 
reforms so downhearted and disappointed by the end of his first term in office. Though they 
voted him in again, they nonetheless started blaming him more openly for not achieving his 
stated objectives, which he had repeatedly promised he would do”. 
Khatami’s first priority was political development. Thus less attention paid by his government 
to economic issues. This negligence was his Achill Hills. Neoconservatives focused on this 
weak point of Khatami government among public, mainly needy classes of the Iranian 
society. Political development slogans in a society which its people struggle for meeting their 
economic needs were not enough. Ehteshami and Zweiri (2007, p.46) highlighted the outcome 
of Khatami policies: 
“Ironically, it was the reformists that gave the masses the voice and the tools to articulate 
their concerns, and it was the movement’s failure to deliver on the tangible needs of the 
people that left the door open for neoconservative forces to present themselves as a new 
alternative.” 
The main financial source of populism, oil revenues, was also in a favourable position. In fact, 
Ahmadinejad could instantly begin his populist programs because oil prices exceeded $70 per 
barrel in 2006. The Iranian oil and gas exports increased from 15.74 billion dollars in 1997 to 
more than 36 billion dollars in 2004 (about 140 % growth).The oil revenues reached a record 
high in 2005. The actual oil revenues at that time were about 50 billion dollars, 35 % more 
than the previous year. In 2005, the state received more than 10 billion dollars from the export 
of non-oil goods, accounting for more than 60 billion dollars of the total foreign exchange 
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revenues of the country. By comparison, in 1998, the total foreign exchange revenues of oil 
and non-oil exports amounted to 10 billion dollars. 
The two other key issues, namely the balance of payment and international reserves were also 
affected positively by high oil prices in the year before the election of Ahmadinejad. The 
considerable increase in foreign exchange revenues (oil and non-oil exports) led to higher 
levels of imports reaching $36.6 billion. In addition, the inflow of foreign capital exceeded the 
outflow of it in 2004 and the capital account showed a surplus of 5.6 billion dollars. 
Consequently, the balance of payment in 2004 recorded the highest level over its past three 
years of 9.6 billion dollars. 
In spite of all the challenges outlined above through the Khatami government, the Iranian 
economy was in a good state in terms of foreign reserves when Ahmadinejad was elected as 
president in June 2005.  
3.2. Phase 1: Reactivation and Redistribution Policies 
In 2005/06, the Iranian economy grew by 5.4%, which was 0.6% higher than in 2004/05 and 
reversed the declining trend of economic growth during the reformist government. The rate of 
inflation fell to about 10%, 5 per cent lower than the previous year. The Misery index in 2005 
compared to its previous year fell by 10% (see Figure 2). Improvement in the balance of 
payments accelerated, mainly because of rising oil prices, which approached and surpassed 
$70 per barrel (averaging about $51.37 a barrel for Iran in 2005/06). Meanwhile, increasing 
imports helped to absorb extra domestic demand created by expansionary fiscal and monetary 
programs of the Ahmadinejad state. In order to implement the first step of the populist 
agenda, Ahmadinejad began expansionary policies. The rate of growth of all the main 
monetary indicators increased sharply in 2005/06. The rate of growth of the monetary base 
which had increased by 17.5% in 2004 shot up to 46.1% in 2005. The growth rate of the 
money supply (M1) jumped from 16.3% to 25.8%. The increase was more moderate for 
liquidity, rising from 30.2% to 34.3%, for total deposits, going from 31.4% to 35.8%, and for 
private sector credit, rising from 37.6% to 38.3%. The financial position of the government 
was very much affected during the final month of the year as the oil revenues rose 12 times 
and subsidies quadrupled in that month. In general, current expenditures registered a huge 
leap of 57.3%, while the increase in total expenditure was 52.5%. Despite the increase in oil 
prices, the budget deficit was 3% higher than last year.  
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Despite increasing money supply, inflation was kept under control in the first phase by fixing 
the prices of governmental goods and services (petroleum products, gas, electricity, water, 
telephone and postal services) at the level of prices in 2004 as well as by increasing the level 
of imports. In 2005 and 2006, the first two years of Ahmadinejad presidency, inflation rate 
reached to 10.4% and 11.9% from 15.3% in the last year of Khatami presidency (2004).6  
Over the first year of the populist government of Ahmadinejad, the Oil Stabilization Fund 
(OSF) was transformed into a safe box for financing populist policies. The Ahmadinejad 
government sent two budget supplements to parliament. These supplements permitted the 
government to draw $11.3b from the oil revenues, instead of borrowing from the OSF. The 
amount of $3.5b of this figure was used for the import of subsidized gasoline. The rest was 
directly converted into domestic expenditures, e.g. food subsidy, and government employees' 
salaries, thus further feeding the populist programs of the state. 
Ahmadinejad submitted his 2006-07 budget proposal to parliament on January 15, 2005. The 
draft of his first budget showed an increase of 27% in total spending compared to the 2005-06 
budget, amounting to $217.4b. The clear point is that his budget heavily relied on oil 
revenues, projecting the oil prices in his budget plan at about $40 per barrel, which was the 
highest price projection throughout the entire Iranian history of budgeting. Real GDP growth 
was expected at 8%, much higher than what had been achieved in the pervious years, showing 
the aim to boost the economy. The projection of the higher base price of oil per barrel enabled 
the government to use a larger portion of the country's total oil export revenues and therefore 
transferring a lower amount of petrodollars into OSF.7 The direct access to oil revenues 
enabled Ahmadinejad to expedite his populist programs which mainly focus on current 
expenditures and short-term projects. The ratio of capital expenditures to current expenditures 
in his budget plan was 48.7%, while the projection of the Fourth Five Year Economic Plan is 
about 55%.8 
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 http://www.indexmundi.com/iran/inflation_rate_(consumer_prices).html  (Access: 12.03.2009).  
7
 The idea of establishing OSF was to save probable extra oil revenues on the basis of oil price 
projection in budget, using it for productive investment and financing non-oil budget deficits. 
8
 Fourth Five-Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan Bill took effect from March 
2005. 
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The support of special interest groups in his budget plan of 2006 was obvious. For instance, 
some of the budget increases compared to the budget of 2005 showed his commitment to 
''bringing oil revenues to the dinner tables of special Iranians'':9 
a) The Services of Islamic Seminaries Organization 10 (Markaze Khadamate Hozeh Elmieh 
Qom), which its directors introduce by the Supreme Leader. The organization provides 
different kinds of services to clerical students throughout the country: increase of 
147.1%. 
b) The Guardian Council 11(Shoraye Negahban), which has a veto power on parliament 
decisions and is almost under the control of the Supreme Leadership of Iran: increase 
of 142.2%. 
c) The Representative Office of the Supreme Leader in Universities 12  (Nahade 
Namayandegi Rahbari dar Daneshgahha), which is a conservative body and plays the 
role of watch dog of the government in universities: increase of 140.8%. 
d) The Islamic Development Office of Islamic Seminaries 13 (Daftare Tablighate Islami 
Hozeh Elmieh Qom), which is active in expanding the Islamic culture and teachings in 
the country: increase of 110.7%. 
e) The Coordinator Council of Islamic Propaganda 14  (Shoraye Hamahangie Tablighate 
Islami), which is mainly active in organizing the pro-government demonstrations and 
gatherings: increase of 96.5%. 
f) The Islamic Development Organization15  (Sazmane Tablighate Islami), which official 
mission is “developing culture of real Islam and manifesting the spiritual life and 
disseminating the belief and faith values”: increase of 95.4%. 
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 Gooya News Agency Website: http://news.gooya.com/economy/archives/2006/02/043393print.php 
(in Persian, Access: 03.03.2009). 
10
 http://osis.ir  
11
 http://www.shora-gc.ir  
12
 http://www.nahad.ir/  
13
 http://www.ipoh.ir/  
14
 http://www.fajr.ir/  
15
 http://www.ido.ir/en/en-default.aspx  
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g) IRIB (Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting)16, the president of which is appointed 
every five years by the Supreme Leader: increase of 46%. 
h) The Cleric Elites Secretary Office17 (Khobregane Rahbari), which is a conservative 
body and evaluates the performance of the Supreme Leader: increase of 44%. 
i) The Supreme Cultural Revolution Council18 (Shoraye Enghelabe Farhangi), which its 
president is Ahamdinejad: increase of 41.9%. 
j) The Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute19, the president of which –
Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi- is the most famous supporter of Ahmadinejad: the budget of 
this institute increased 10 times from 3500 million rials ($360,824) at the end of 
Kahtami presidency to 35000 million rials ($3,608,247) in the first year of 
Ahmadinejad’s governance. This huge increase has continued during the first three 
years of Ahmadinehad’s governance and reached the 70 billion rials ($7,216,494) 
mark in early 2009.20 
According to Amirreza Khadem, a member of the 7th parliament, the average rate of increase 
in the budget of religious bodies was 100% in the budget of 2006-07. This considerable rise in 
the budget of interest groups can be compared to the increase in the budget of the Health 
Organisation (9.4%), the Sport Organization of (4.1%) and the Education Organization (0%). 
It is interesting to note that the budget under the control of the Islamic Development 
Organization, which amounted to 190 billion rials is 19 times more than the budget of the 
Ministry of Health.21  In sum, the budget of the populist state pays very little regard to 
financial discipline and relies heavily on oil revenues to reactivate the economy. The 
expenditure patterns show the aim to distribute the money in exchange for the votes. The two 
important populist plans of Ahmadinejad upon taking office were “Imam Reza Charity Fund” 
and “Justice Shares”.  
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 http://www.irib.ir/English  
17
 www.khobreganrahbari.com  
18
 http://www.iranculture.org  
19
 http://www.qabas.org/index_en.asp  
20
 Rooz Online Website, 10.02.2009: http://www.roozonline.com/archives/2009/02/post_11508.php 
(in Persian, Access: 03.03.2009). 
21
 Gooya Agency Website: http://news.gooya.com/economy/archives/2006/02/043393print.php 
(Access: 03.03.2009) 
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3.2.1. Establishing the ''Imam Reza Care (or Charity) Fund'' 
The first legislation to emerge from his newly formed government was a 12 billion rial 
($1.3b) fund called ''Imam Reza Care Fund''. The initial capital of the fund was financed by 
a reduction in the National Oil Company (NIOC)’s share of oil revenues.22 Ahmadinejad's 
government claimed that this fund would be used to help young people to get jobs and to 
afford marriage, as well as assist them in purchasing their own homes.23 According to the 
initial proposals put forward by the Ahmadinejad government, the fund was introduced 
through a non-governmental body and it was proposed that 30% could be raised by the Oil 
Stabilization Fund and the rest by credits in annual budgets, interest-free funds of banks24, 
public assistance, profits of governmental companies, Fund membership payments and 
repayments of funds.25  
The major problem of the Fund was the inability of its advocates to find a proper funding for 
the missions of the Fund. Parliament deputies and economic experts immediately objected to 
the provision to take 30% of the OSF funds in order to kick-start the project. 
After several months of discussions between government and parliament, three different 
Funds were created: the Employment Assistance Fund, the Rural Development Fund and the 
Banking Account for Youth Marriage, which came under the collective heading of ''Imam 
Reza Cooperative, Employment and Marriage Fund”.  
3.2.2. Distribution of governmental companies' shares to needy people (Justice Shares) 
The second populist program which was intensely publicized by the Ahmadinejad 
government and broadly advertised on national TV channels was the ''Justice Shares''.26 Under 
this scheme, the government planed to give the shares of privatized firms at subsidized prices 
to low-income households. Following this plan, in July 2006, Khamenei - the Supreme Leader 
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 Baztab News Agency Website: www.baztab.com/news/28471.php (in Persian, Access: 02.03.2009). 
23
 Baztab, Ibid. 
24
 Intrest-free lending or Gharz-al-hasaneh is a common practice in Islamic Banking.  
25
 Mehr News Agency Website: www.mehrnews.com/fa/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=312770  (in 
Persian, Access: 02.03.2009). 
26
 Law and regulation of Justice Shares distribution is available here:  
http://www.en.ipo.ir/index.aspx?siteid=83&pageid=305 (in English, Access: 03.03.2009). Distribution 
procedure can be seen here: http://www.en.ipo.ir/index.aspx?siteid=83&pageid=299 (Access: 
03.03.2009).  
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- ordered the three branches of government to hand over 80% of the shares of major  
state-owned firms, including key large industries:  
The main idea behind this plan was taken from ''voucher privatization'' in the former Soviet 
bloc.27 The distribution of vouchers that could be exchanged for shares was the dominant 
privatization method in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Latvia, Kazakhstan and initially also 
in Slovakia.  
However, Ahmadinejad’s plan to distribute wealth among low-income Iranians in exchange 
for their loyalty has some serious shortcomings: 
a) Because of their inefficient structure and operation as well as poor management, the 
government compensates for some of the annual losses of governmental companies by 
giving subsidies. The number of loss making companies increased from 75 in 1997 to 
87 in 2006. The amount of loss increased from 1492.2 billion rials (150,327,455 USD) 
to 43266.4 billion rials (4,359,294,710 USD) for the same period. To offset this loss, 
the subsidy increased from 531.8 billion rials (53,501,259 USD) to 4150.6 billion rials 
(418,136,020 USD) for this period.28 There are some exceptions, especially in oil and 
gas industry. Of course, the companies in this sector remain under control of state. The 
maximum reported annual profit for governmental companies has been about 3-4%.29 
Such a profit is negligible in an inflationary economy. Each qualified person receives 
the total amount of 5 million rials shares (around $500). Assuming the optimistic 
situation, the share holders receive 150000 rials or about $16 per year (taking a fixed 
profit rate of 3% for each year).  
b) The second criticism refers to the identification of the target groups. According to the 
plan, the justice shares should be distributed among some 7 million people in its initial 
phase, including those covered by charity services of the Imam Khomeini Relief 
Committee and State Welfare Organizations, as well as members of Basij (militia of 
government) and Sepah (Revolutionary Guards). The number of recipients will 
increase to 21 million, during the course of the implementation of project. Usually, 
                                                     
27
 This is a privatization method where citizens are given or can inexpensively buy a book of vouchers 
that represent potential shares in any state-owned company. This method was mainly used in the early-
to-mid 1990s in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. 
28
 http://www.spac.ir/barnameh/Barnameh%20228/p-2.htm (in Persian, Access: 12.03.2009).  
29
 Deutsche Welle Website: Interview with Mohsen Safaie Farahani, 19 Aug. 2006: http://www.dw-
world.de/dw/article/0,,2408509,00.html (in Persian, Access: 03.03.2009).  
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membership of some of these organizations is not subject to real financial problems of 
householders but depends on their loyalty to the government. Ultimately, well-
connected groups benefit from much more attractive shares over this program. 
3.3. Phases 2 and 3: Has the Ahmadinejad state surpassed the Second Phase? 
In the second phase, the economy runs into shortages. This is partly due to the increasing 
shortage of foreign exchange and the price controls. The government introduces protection 
and reviews the price control system. Inflation increases considerably and wages too. Finally, 
budget deficits will worsen as a result of the high amount of subsidies 
The necessary condition for entering into the second phase is the imbalance between foreign 
exchange reserves and the populist spending. The distinguishing characteristic of the second 
phase and the third phase is the subsidy policy (see Table 1). While in the second phase 
subsidies tend to rise, the government reduces the level of subsidies in the third phase. There 
is some alarming evidence that the Ahmadinejad government has surpassed the second phase 
and is in the third phase: 
a) Figure 3 shows the development of the Iranian heavy oil prices during the presidency 
of Khatami (1997-2005) and Ahmadinajd (since 2005). We observe a significant 
increase of oil prices from the level of $20 to $60 per barrel at the end of the Khatami 
presidency. Ahmadinejad began his presidency in an attractive oil market situation. 
Such an increase financed the first phase of his government’s populists spending. 
Ahmadinejad was highly confident of the increasing oil prices 30 , neglecting the 
warning messages of the Iranian economists about the inflationary effects of his 
aggressive spending. 31  The first phase ended when the oil market collapsed in 
September 2008. The oil price reached $39 a barrel in February 2009. In the face of 
such a negative oil market in the second half of 2008, the $307 billion budget has to be 
                                                     
30
 In July 2008, Ahmadinejad claimed that the price of oil would never fall below $100 a barrel. See: 
http://www.economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12650281 (Access: 
05.03.2009). 
31
 In November 2008, a group of 60 Iranian economists sent a letter to Ahmaedinajd, challenging his 
populist approach toward economy. In this 30 page letter, economists criticized his policies: “ Meager 
economic growth, increasing unemployment rate, increasing inflation rate, crisis in capital markets, 
government expansionary budget…, inequality and poverty combined with global crisis have a big 
impact on exports and imports of the country”. Ahmadinejad paid no attention to this letter. See: 
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/nov/10/world/fg-iran10 (Access: 05.03.2009).  
18/20 
financed by a deficit. The estimated borrowing amount is between 7-50 billion 
dollars.32  
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Fig.3. Weekly Iran heavy spot price FOB (dollars per barrel). 
Source: EIA (http://www.eia.doe.gov)  
According to the D&E framework, the Ahmaedinejad’s government entered into his second 
phase. In the second phase, the populist government resists a reduction or any reform of 
subsidies. The massive subsidies on fuel products continued during most of 2008. The 
government spent 13.6 million rials ($1380) per person in 2008 as subsidies, mainly for 
energy.33 An increasing inflation rate as a common aspect of the second and third phases is 
evident. The Ahmadinejad government initially managed to lower inflation in its first phase of 
state. However, the inflation rate increased significantly in 2007, reaching 18.4%.34  
 
b) In the third phase, the financial pressures due to shortage of foreign exchange reserves 
(e.g. mainly due to a fall in oil prices) force the populist government to undertake 
fundamental revisions in its aggressive spending. In January 2009, Ahmadinajd 
presented the budget to the parliament. This budget totalled 2827000 billion rials 
                                                     
32
 http://www.wsws.org/articles/2008/oct2008/iran-o29.shtml (Access: 05.03.09) 
33
 Based on another source, in 2008, the government paid $100 billion direct and indirect subsidies for 
goods.  
34
 http://www.spac.ir/barnameh/306/p7.htm (in Persian, Access:12.03.2009)  
1st Term of 
Khatami 
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($287 billion). In a rare example of Iranian budget history, the 2009 budget fell by 
2.5% compared to its pervious year’s actual budget. Ahmadinejad who used to ignore 
the warnings from economist during his first and second phases of state, admitted the 
crisis symptoms in December 2008. He said that the government would have to 
abandon “a major part” of its public projects.35 Apart from suspending these projects, 
the populist government had to revise its hardly manageable subsidy plans. In 
December 2008, Ahmadinejad presented a plan to parliament proposing an end to fuel, 
water, and electricity subsidies. “Falling oil prices encourages us to promptly 
implement the bill; it is time we made a decision”, Ahmadinejad told the parliament as 
he defended the removal of subsidies.36  
The evidence implies that Ahmadinejad populist governance is in its third phase of life. The 
fourth phase would mean his removal from office. Whether this will happen will be cleared in 
the next presidential election in June 12, 2009.   
 
4. Conclusion 
I have examined the political life process of the Ahmadinejad’s government on the basis of 
the D&E analytical framework which is designed for populist regimes. This framework has 
four phases. The D&E model points out that most populist regimes have a promising start: the 
inflation and unemployment rate are reduced, while subsidies increase. This is what Iranians 
experienced during the first two years of the Ahmadinejad’s government. By entering into the 
second phase, there are not enough foreign exchange reserves because of the reduction of oil 
revenues. Consequently, the inflation rate which was controlled by regulated prices and by 
increasing imports can no longer be maintained. In this phase, there are increasing pressures 
on the populist state to reform the subsidy system. However, this reform is costly and the 
populist government is afraid of losing support. The third phase of a populist regime has 
much in common with the second phase except for position of populist state against heavy 
subsidies. The high imbalance between the financial sources of populist regime and its 
spending in the third phase will make a reduction or halting of subsidies unavoidable. The 
                                                     
35
 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122973669825423389.html?mod=googlenews_wsj (Access: 04.03.2009).  
36
 http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/12/30/news/ML-Iran-Subsidies.php  (Access: 04.03.2009).  In May 2007, 
the government had started to implement a rationing system for gasoline consumption. However, there was never 
a direct statement about ending the energy subsidies as mentioned by Ahmadinejad one year later in 2008.  
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Iranian economy in 2008 and 2009 reflects the third phase of the populist state. The fourth 
phase may be realized in the coming presidency election in June 2009.  
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